

## THE NEW WOMAN AS “TIED-UP DOG”: Amy E. Tanner’s Situated Knowledges

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Amy E. Tanner pursued a series of ventures on the margins of the discipline of psychology from 1895 through the 1910s. As a midwesterner and a woman, she found herself denied opportunities at both research universities and elite women’s colleges, spending the most visible phase of her career as G. Stanley Hall’s assistant at Clark University. A narrative of Tanner’s life furnishes more than a glimpse at the challenges faced by women scholars in the past. As an investigator engaged with the debate over the mental variability of the sexes, an active class passer in the name of social reform, and a spiritualist debunker, her broad interests illuminate how broadly the proper scope of the new psychology could be constituted. Throughout her writing, Tanner offered an embedded, situated account of knowledge production.

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In January 1907, G. Stanley Hall, then serving as president of Clark University, received an unsolicited plea for patronage written on the letterhead of a small women’s college in Pennsylvania. The letter’s author, one Amy Eliza Tanner, was a professor of philosophy at Wilson College, but was seeking an appointment as a paid fellow in psychology at Clark.<sup>1</sup> Such “begging letters” were a common genre of communication at the time, as the nation’s leaders in business and other fields were inundated by requests for help from those less able to navigate the vagaries of the market economy.<sup>2</sup> To be a successful specimen, such letters had to demonstrate both the author’s innate worthiness and a lack of responsibility for his or her particular financial hardships. As she revealed in a subsequent letter, Tanner certainly qualified. With a bachelor’s degree from the University of Michigan and a doctorate *magna cum laude* from the University of Chicago, she possessed a distinguished academic record. In addition to various scholarly articles, she had published a book close to Hall’s own interests: *The Child: His Thinking, Feeling, and Doing* (1904).<sup>3</sup> Yet as a woman with a midwestern academic pedigree, Tanner found it impossible to break into the eastern university establishment. Perhaps a brief appointment at Clark could change her academic fortunes for she wrote, “I have reached the maximum salary here and have developed my work as far as the size of the college will justify.” With some

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bitterness, she noted that “One is truly unfortunate, from a financial standpoint, to be a woman with a love of philosophizing!”<sup>4</sup>

There are clues in the previous statement that illuminate part of the reason why Tanner’s life is worthy of historical reflection, even if her intellectual legacy to the discipline may seem unsubstantial. First, hers is a reminder of the difficulties faced by women attempting to enter the sciences and the professions. More important, however, is her mention of a “standpoint,” a term she used frequently and that has since become a keyword in feminist science studies. According to this school of thought, acknowledging and embracing the particular of standpoint of the observer are not understood as a rejection of science, but rather objectivity is produced by individual actors from locatable, embodied perspectives. Those who perceive from the peripheries and from below are particularly privileged in this epistemological framework as they are deemed capable of envisioning the object of inquiry in a fashion that the worldview of the dominant will not permit. Objectivity then is about one’s relationship to particular objects rather than an effacement of one’s personhood.<sup>5</sup> Such work is critical of canonical definitions of scientific observation that are predicated on the erasure of the specific scientist’s presence as mediating actor in the experimental procedure.<sup>6</sup>

Although her use was somewhat different, here and in much of her writing, Tanner was acutely aware of the importance that she was writing from the standpoint marked as female. Although containing many obstacles, Tanner understood that such a position within psychology opened possible routes for the remaking of the cultural prescriptions assigned to her gendered identity.<sup>7</sup> Ascribing a feminist standpoint epistemology to Tanner is not an ahistorical gesture, for she operated in the intellectual circles where such a stance gained an early formal articulation. Turn-of-the-century Chicago served as a crucible where pragmatist epistemology was fused with feminist politics. In navigating the demands of the new corporate order that made manifest the interdependence of all individuals, a group of thinkers articulated a worldview that held that all cognition was purpose directed and where the notion of a transcendental, unencumbered selfhood was a fiction. Leaders in this movement were philosophers like John Dewey and George Herbert Mead, but also activist social scientists like Jane Addams and Jessie Taft. Pragmatism and feminism both favored ways of knowing that emphasized the position of the individual knower, not as a refutation of science but as a condition of its possibility.<sup>8</sup> Similar sensibilities marked Tanner, who shared a common intellectual and social environment with these figures, and such principles seemed to have governed her approach to the world at a tacit level. When she wrote on a wide-ranging assortment of topics, she frequently offered a proudly embodied knowledge, one linked back to the framework of her personal experience. Yet her writing was more than introspective autobiography; she worked to translate her subjective experience into insights about the mental and social worlds.

The study of gender relations has been one of the most prominent strains within the critical history of psychology. The initial impulse was toward the identification of forgotten pioneers and the recovery of the experiences of the first generation of female psychologists. Such scholarship renewed interest in early 20th-century figures such as Christine Ladd-Franklin, Mary Whiton Calkins, Leta S. Hollingworth, and Helen Thompson Woolley.<sup>9</sup> Moving from women’s history to gender analysis, feminist historians also addressed the gendered assumptions

that constituted much psychological knowledge. These studies ranged from how laboratory introspection was coded as masculine in E. B. Titchener's network of experimentalists to the construction of the female intellect as a biologically inferior entity.<sup>10</sup> My aim in this article is to combine these two approaches to illuminate the plight of Amy Tanner while drawing inspiration from a third, namely, the history of failure. Recently Elizabeth Scarborough, a prominent practitioner of women's history of psychology, has argued for the necessity of recovering the lives of "those who dropped out and those who converted their professional tools to labor in nonpsychology settings."<sup>11</sup> Although all female scientists of the era certainly faced obstacles and marginalization within their disciplines, the great pioneers achieved a measure of success through women's colleges and applied fields, with a few, like Calkins, even gaining some form of recognition in their lifetime like the presidency of the APA.<sup>12</sup> Such was not the case of Tanner, who labored as a mere fellow or research associate at elite institutions for the majority of her academic life.<sup>13</sup>

Although unsurprisingly overlooked by historians, Amy Tanner's circumstances provide an ideal lens for comprehending how the career of a female psychologist could dissipate. Through the critical reading of published sources combined with the use of her male mentor's archival records, the historian can construct a "thick description" of a career that never quite materialized and the multiple strategies used by an individual to sustain the life of an academic psychologist.<sup>14</sup> Because of the nature of archives, tracing the path of a psychologist who failed to secure an institutional position would ordinarily be difficult or even impossible. Ironically, it is the complaint-filled correspondence between the established G. Stanley Hall and the marginal Amy Tanner that facilitates such historical reconstruction.

Furthermore, Tanner's multiple attempts at achieving recognition through a series of unorthodox investigations illuminate an underlying breadth beneath the "new" psychology's façade of uniformity. Attempting to model their work on the day's natural sciences, psychologists increasingly turned toward laboratory experimentation, and soon afterward mental testing, to establish a disciplinary identity. This move has been admonished by a number of the discipline's critics for ignoring its social basis or its capacity to craft new forms of identity that its subjects come to internalize. Yet, in terms its practices, psychology has always been more of a reflexive science than its official pronouncements would indicate.<sup>15</sup> From the outset, leading voices within the discipline rejected the notion that the laboratory provided the sole means for examining the psychological domain. Although ignored by his international network of students, Wilhelm Wundt argued that his physiological psychology ought to be complemented with a *Völkerpsychologie*, rooted in natural history's methods of collecting a people's cultural artifacts.<sup>16</sup> More famously in his own day, William James rejected the nascent discipline's overreliance on a single method of inquiry, cautioning his peers to avoid the "snares of psychology."<sup>17</sup> Although controversial, these statements serve as a reminder of the true diversity of psychology's domain, even as equally influential voices sought to marginalize or ignore such perspectives. One of the tasks of history is not to reaffirm the discipline's established self-image but to do justice to its actual complexity.

Although essentially forgotten today, Tanner's career spanned the scope of the discipline's interests, ranging as it did from standard topics like child study

and questions of sex differences to more outré ones like the investigation of spiritualism and the use of class passing. Hence, my interest in Tanner is more than biographical as her life opens a window onto the cultural history of the science during her lifetime.<sup>18</sup> Although much of the research conducted by Tanner was marginal to what the dominant scientific ideology deemed the legitimate scope of the psychological, it still needs to be understood as constituting part of the discipline's past.<sup>19</sup> Rather than focusing on the governing ideologies, tracing the dynamics of Tanner's career permits the historian to map out how the new psychology was practiced, revealing a more complex field than official pronouncements would allow.<sup>20</sup> Although brass instruments psychology remained primarily a gentlemanly pursuit, the discipline always exceeded such confines. What constitutes human nature and the psychological greatly exceeds the conventional self-definition of the discipline.<sup>21</sup> Tanner did operate within the discipline's limits as defined between 1890 and 1910, and her work on spiritualism even contributed to the policing of its boundaries. Although her degree from the University of Chicago was officially in philosophy, soon after she enrolled in her graduate studies she commenced performing psychology experiments on equipment left behind in the city from the World Columbia Exposition under the direction of James Rowland Angell.<sup>22</sup> Throughout her career, her research was almost exclusively published and reviewed within psychology journals. The heterogeneity of her topics of concern and cultivation of reflexivity may force a redefinition of the new psychology, but her work was part of it.

The final decade of the 19th century, when Tanner entered graduate school at Chicago and attempted to secure an academic position, was a tumultuous one for American women. This era witnessed the creation of a new social type, the "New Woman": a college-educated, middle-class female who sought personal fulfillment in the form of public philanthropy or salaried work. Although not relinquishing a feminine identity, the New Woman was an individual who sought an identity beyond the domestic sphere. The concept crystallized through the lithographs of Charles Dana Gibson and his eponymous portrayals of young women. The Gibson Girl was characterized by her high collared white shirt tucked into a plain dark ankle-length skirt. Such a costume was meant to signify the woman's physical freedom; not constrained by her dress, she was capable of engaging in athletics, education, and other public activities. As an ideal type, the New Woman was characterized by her youth, independence, and competence.<sup>23</sup> As a public icon still largely limited to those identifiable as American-born, Protestant, and White, the new ethos expressed itself in renewed calls for female enfranchisement, expanded educational and professional opportunities, and participation in the reform activities that would characterize the Progressive Era.<sup>24</sup>

Founded in 1892, the University of Chicago served as a major locus for the manifestation of the New Woman as it became an important center for women's higher education, especially in the social sciences. Unlike many peer institutions that refused to grant doctoral degrees even when they permitted exceptional women to enroll in their courses and conduct research in their laboratories, Chicago not only admitted women but nourished their pedagogical development. Although women found it difficult to secure permanent faculty appointments there, in terms of the day's standards, the university offered rather unique opportunities.<sup>25</sup> The leaders of the psychologically oriented philosophy depart-

ment, Dewey, Mead, and Angell, all came to Chicago either as instructors at or former students of the University of Michigan, another school with a strong tradition of including women in higher education, and each was married to a college-educated woman active outside the domestic sphere. The version of the psychology that they articulated did not stress the fixity of the individuals but rather their malleability under the influence of the environment.<sup>26</sup>

Unsurprisingly, disruptions in the dominant separate-spheres ideology provoked concerns as established norms were being called into question. Within the professions, many men questioned women's capacities to serve as social and intellectual equals. Physicians would castigate women who opted for education and employment as willingly damaging their bodies and expending their energies elsewhere than their proper function, namely, child rearing and reproduction.<sup>27</sup> Within the relatively new discipline of psychology, these concerns manifested themselves in the notorious controversy over the variability hypothesis and the study of "the community of ideas of men and women." Such studies sought to prove that men were better suited for higher education because their minds exhibited a greater diversity of ideas and capacity for abstract thought when compared with their female peers. Men possessed a larger community of concepts, whereas women were mired in the concrete and exhibited a smaller range of originality.

This particular debate was sparked by Joseph Jastrow's 1891 account of the "mental statistics" expressed by his undergraduate psychology students. Newly arrived at the coeducational University of Wisconsin in 1888, Jastrow sought to put the notion of female intellectual equality to an empirical test.<sup>28</sup> He requested that his students individually compile and write on a paper a list of 100 words as quickly as they could. Although in his initial report he noted a number of trends, such as one male student's propensity to list only rhyming words, thereby demonstrating an "ear-mindedness," Jastrow's overall thrust was toward the assessment of gender differences. Taking into consideration the lists of only the 25 swiftest male respondents, Jastrow compared the variation in the words selected by the two populations. He concluded that not only did his women students exhibit a noticeably smaller choice of words, but that, in a widely cited passage, "the feminine traits revealed by this study are an attention to the immediate surroundings, to the finished product, to the ornamental, the individual, and the concrete; while the masculine preference is for the more remote, the constructive, the useful, the general, and the abstract."<sup>29</sup> Jastrow held that when each was asked to free associate under the pressure of time, he had uncovered domestically oriented women, preoccupied with material household goods and fashions, and philosophically refined men.

The ensuing controversy centered first on whether women did indeed exhibit quantifiably less mental variability and second on how one ought to attribute such sex differences. For Jastrow, the male's greater capacity to generate a more varied list of words was an indicator of a superior mentality endowed by biology. Although 2 decades later he would emerge as a voice critical of the equation of intelligence and heredity, this was certainly not his stance in 1890s.<sup>30</sup> Jastrow's later concerns were articulated as "intelligence," which was becoming a popular language to discuss restricting immigration to the United States, an issue that resonated with his personal history. By and large, his capacity to formulate

sociological versus naturalistic explanations for difference was largely constrained by his identification with the group at stake.<sup>31</sup> Jastrow's interpretation of his data was soon challenged, and Calkins, now a professor at Wellesley, sought to replicate his experiment. Calkins and her collaborator, Cordelia Nevers, repudiated Jastrow's findings, arguing that the population of their women's college more closely resembled the mentality of his rugged midwestern young men.<sup>32</sup> Calkins' decision to challenge her male colleague's assumptions was not surprising, considering that these were the same years that she was being denied formal entry into Harvard's psychology laboratory and its degree-granting privileges on the basis of her sex. Calkins' primary tactic was to focus on the pronounced similarities between the sexes on the basis of the results of the tests she performed. For Tanner, this response lacked sufficient emphasis on what she perceived as the true origin of sexual difference.

Tanner embraced debate over the community of ideas, making it an entry point into academic discourse. Tanner's stance in the debate was considerably different from that of her contemporaries, who tended to ground their positions in the objectivity of a mechanically administered mental science and the detection of flaws in the design of individual tests. Although Calkins ultimately acknowledged the problems of accurately assessing a woman's true ability under existing social conditions, the thrust of her initial analysis and her tone were markedly different from those of Tanner. Calkins did note that the propensity for women to list household furnishings among their words was most likely the product of "cultivated interests" and that Jastrow's style of experimentation could not isolate the effects of the environment.<sup>33</sup> Tanner held that the debate was hopelessly confused because both, even Calkins, failed to adequately distinguish whether the sexual differences that were observed had their roots in inherited mental traits or in the educational and social experience of individuals.<sup>34</sup>

Tanner pointed toward the inadequacy of contemporary methods for assessing a woman's mentality because they could not be calibrated for the social oppression she experienced. One had to consider how her mental processes had been channeled into certain habits of thought due to the particularities of her upbringing. In the pages of *The Psychological Review*, Tanner wrote, "The real tendencies of women cannot be known until they are free to choose, any more than those of a tied-up dog can be."<sup>35</sup> Such language was atypical of the purportedly apolitical learned journal, but undoubtedly the topic deeply resonated with Tanner, for her observation was intended to extend well beyond the controversy within psychology about the gender of the intellect. For always in the shadows of Jastrow's variability hypothesis was the question about women's opportunities for occupations. As a woman seeking to enter into a profession, Tanner seemed acutely aware of such a context. As such, Tanner was a participant in the formulation of an early 20th-century feminist ideology, with its central tenets being opposition to sexual hierarchy, a conviction in the belief that a woman's position is socially constructed, and an adherence to a gendered group identity.<sup>36</sup>

Tanner's own doctoral dissertation in philosophy was closely linked, but more orthodox: an experimental and introspective examination of the association of ideas.<sup>37</sup> Here her earlier concern with the mind's governance by deeply etched mental habits is expressed in a more conventional manner.<sup>38</sup> Yet, in an era when the use of introspection was largely deemed a male preserve, Tanner emphasized

that she possessed the prerequisite self-discipline.<sup>39</sup> She bragged of her ability to perform the required “series of mental gymnastics” necessary to objectively observe one’s own thoughts.<sup>40</sup> She detailed how she transformed her past educational experience, in this instance the content of her high school education, into an alienated, objective object of study. With occasional references to gendered impropriety, Tanner’s dissertation reads as a transformative text wherein she recognizes her situatedness in order to demonstrate her capacity for scientific transcendence. For instance, she stressed how “[a]s a psychologist, it is our business to analyze our mental process in deciding not to take a drink with the boys, or in yielding to the temptation.”<sup>41</sup>

Yet, the anxiety expressed in the 1896 *Psychological Review* article came to fruition on completion of her dissertation as no career opportunities immediately manifested themselves. For the next 4 years, she served as an “associate” of Chicago’s philosophy department until a professorship at Wilson College became available.<sup>42</sup> While teaching at Wilson, she published her first monograph, *The Child*, a contribution to the burgeoning child study movement. Broadening her interest from mentalism toward Hall’s brand of developmental psychology and pedagogy, Tanner seems to fit the mold proscribed to women psychologists in the first decade of the 20th century.<sup>43</sup> It is important to recall that from the outset, Tanner sustained a concern for the gender of work in her psychological writings, a theme to which she would return.

This interest manifested itself most fully in one of her more unorthodox investigations for the time, a covert ethnography of the waitressing profession: Tanner and her unnamed female companion did not simply observe the working life of waitresses, they literally became them for a short but telling period of time. The act of passing as a member of a different class had become a popular technique for addressing the labor question beginning in the 1890s.<sup>44</sup> Although a few female investigators practiced such skills, class passing was originally a manly pursuit, closely identified with the rough world of tramping. Although later legitimized in the form of participant-observation, such outings then occupied a more marginal place in the human sciences.<sup>45</sup> In a series of popular articles and books, the investigative journalist Josiah Flynt and the Princeton political economist Walter Wyckoff celebrated their own capacity to cast off their privileged upbringing and mingle among migratory laborers. Although they did invoke the evidence of such intense and immediate experiences as their authority to comment on questions of social reform, more often their narrative served as titillating accounts of an abject other, as if class were a biological quality.<sup>46</sup>

Reporting in *The American Journal of Sociology*, Tanner offered her own sensual account of her life as an anonymous waitress, a remarkable social psychological examination of female labor. She asserted that she was motivated to carry out the project by “a commingled yearning for adventure and philanthropy.” Drawing on a common metaphor within the genre, she spoke of submerging herself into the depths of “the masses.”<sup>47</sup> As her former existence as a philosophy professor ebbed away, she found herself immersed in the waitress’s mental state, overburdened as it was with the smells of food that made one no longer hungry and the weariness of physical labor.<sup>48</sup> Her aim was psychological, to ascertain what effect the bodily conditions of waitressing had on the mind, and she offered her own body, bruised by the routines of service, as the primary

category of evidence.<sup>49</sup> What Tanner uncovered was a fundamental incommensurability between the working waitresses and the “mistress” who oversaw their labor. This inability to communicate across class lines was manifested itself because the mistress “lacked ability to imagine our bodily feelings.”<sup>50</sup> Whereas historian Mark Pittenger has suggested that Tanner’s study fit within the “down and out” tradition that ultimately reaffirmed the class superiority of the performer on returning to the world “above,” Tanner emphasized the failure to recognize subjectivity across class lines in the Progressive Era and how such an attention to difference ought to be considered in reform circles.<sup>51</sup> Her strategy was to help articulate the perspective of the voiceless laborers by attempting to inhabit their world and share in their experiences; her account was governed by the ideal of empathy rather than judgment.

Flynt and Wyckoff were not the influences that were most self-consciously evoked in Tanner’s final report; rather it was Jane Addams. Such an affinity is not surprising, considering Addams’ famous account of the “subjective necessity of the social settlement” among the New Women. Addams was similarly a highly educated woman without many professional prospects who sought fulfillment through urban philanthropy and social work with the creation of Hull House in 1889. The creation of settlement houses in the country’s poorest urban neighborhoods led to the cultivation of interpersonal bonds between elite reformers and immigrant women. Although such relationships were fraught with class tensions and misunderstandings, the women of the social settlements constituted themselves as advocates of working women.<sup>52</sup> Despite sharing common social spaces, some felt that there still existed an experiential divide between the two groups, something that they hoped to rectify by embracing class passing. For example, in the spring of 1907, the millionaire heiress and union activist Maud Younger published a similar narrative of her experiences as a member of New York City’s Waitresses’ Union in the popular, but reform-oriented magazine, *McClure’s*.<sup>53</sup>

Although both used a similar methodology and shared common goals, there were differences in their reports. Younger tended to focus more on external observers, like the difficulties in locating regular employment and the obstacles to learning the waitress’s skill. Younger’s articles included anecdotes about her fellow workers, their struggles, and their desire to form a union. In contrast, Tanner’s account consisted almost exclusively of an introspective reflection on her subjective state under similar conditions. Tanner used her own experience among the waitresses, especially mental and physical exhaustion, to comment on the need for labor organization and the demand for a shorter working day. Whereas some social observers asserted that a lack of radicalism among waitresses indicated a complacency or happiness with their lot, Tanner held that such a stance ignored the lived experience of the worker. Much like her perspective on female occupations in her intervention into the variability hypothesis debate, she held that previous observers had ignored how preexisting social relations channeled the mental habits of persons along certain lines. The only means of gaining true understanding was by embracing the working life to uncover what mental habits it produced. She noted how “my past aches and pains urge me to add that the hours stated should be eight in number.”<sup>54</sup> In this situation, her authority did not derive from her academic expertise but rather from her embodied experience. Hence, Tanner explicitly did not offer a “view from nowhere” perspective on this

issue; it was precisely through her situated knowledge of being a working waitress that she could attain a mere “glimpse” at their subjectivity. Moreover, she assured her reader that all she possessed from the experience was a partial understanding, the aforementioned “glimpse,” recognizing her own limits.

At this point, it seemed possible that Tanner's career would turn toward investigations of working conditions in the name of reform. Such a choice was common among many of her female peers in the social sciences at the University of Chicago. She followed her experiences as a waitress by surveying, with another investigator, Alice E. Foote, the living and working conditions in the coal fields of Pennsylvania during the summer of 1907. This study was completed as part of a commission from the Young Women's Christian Association to better understand wage-earning women. This national project was coordinated by Annie Marion MacLean, another Chicago alumna and an assistant professor through their extension school. Beginning with the department store, MacLean had begun a series of ethnographic studies of women's work in 1899. Yet this potential avenue for making a career through reform-oriented sociological research closed down rather rapidly when Tanner came into conflict with the survey's director. In the pages of *The Nation*, Tanner accused MacLean of plagiarizing her Pennsylvania report. Originally the project, as carried out by a number of female field agents under MacLean's direction, was to be made public in a single synthetic volume. Instead, MacLean had opted to start publishing the individual reports under her byline in *The American Journal of Sociology*. Although MacLean acknowledged Tanner's contribution to the project in the final book-length report, the dispute seems to have ended their collaboration.<sup>55</sup> As Tanner was falling out of favor with her network of Chicago social reformers, G. Stanley Hall's potential patronage became crucial for her survival as an intellectual.

It was between her waitressing investigation and her falling out with MacLean that Tanner made contact with the Clark president in an attempt to enter the ranks of the eastern establishment. Hall, who was familiar with her work *The Child*, was keen to recruit the philosopher–psychologist. Although he was enthusiastic about her arrival, he cautioned her to take only a leave of absence from Wilson. Even with the Clark association, “It is, alas, only too true that there are but few places open to women who are interested in philosophy in any of its branches.”<sup>56</sup> Over the next few months, Hall negotiated for a role for Tanner at his university, and in May he reported that she had been named an “Honorary University Fellow.”<sup>57</sup> Tanner remained career-minded and insisted that she be able to withdraw from the fellowship if a more lucrative or permanent position were offered.<sup>58</sup> Agreeing, Hall assured her that “I do not think, however, it is all selfishness that makes me hope that the better opening will wait a year and when it comes will be brighter enough to pay for the delay.”<sup>59</sup> Over the next year, Hall tried yet failed to use his influence in pedagogy circles to get Tanner some patronage, especially to secure a publishing contract for a series of French fairy tales she had translated. In the interim, she became a frequent book reviewer for Hall's *American Journal of Psychology*, focusing ethics alongside critical reviews of psychical research and other borderline projects. Although he seemed to admire her eclecticism, professionally it was not creating many new opportunities for her.<sup>60</sup>

In 1909, Hall established the Children's Institute at Clark in an attempt to better link the university with the community, and Tanner was named head of the

department of experimental pedagogy.<sup>61</sup> This appointment was despite the fact that back in 1907 she warned Hall that she knew “almost nothing about the laboratory methods employed in the study of children, use of apparatus, and so forth, and wish to become familiar with them.”<sup>62</sup> Yet Tanner did not espouse an technoscientific viewpoint as the label “experimental pedagogy” might indicate. During her tenure, she and her close ally Theodate Smith cultivated close ties between the Clark University researchers and more politically oriented child welfare advocates. Initially responsible for the administration of intelligence tests alongside other visual and auditory examinations, Tanner’s role soon shifted toward serving as a community liaison, organizing a series of broadly conceived Saturday evening lectures on pedagogical themes. Tanner, in particular, combined her philosophical and psychological interests and frequently lectured to community groups about the moral ideas of children.<sup>63</sup>

The most widely read work that Tanner produced under Hall’s mentorship was *Studies in Spiritism* (1910), an account of their sustained investigation of the highly respected Boston medium Mrs. Piper. Discovered and championed by William James in the mid-1880s, the reclusive Piper was the great hope of international psychical research circles as even the most skeptical observers could find no conscious fraud and no one questioned her sincerity. The head of the American Society for Psychical Research, Richard Hodgson, had devoted considerable time to investigating her powers and, following his death in 1905, it appeared that his spirit communicated frequently through her mediumship. From the 1880s to the 1910s, numerous leading psychologists devoted considerable energy to the study of paranormal phenomena. Such an interest was a crucial element in the formation of academic, experimental psychology as its own distinct discipline. Much of the public found spiritual mediums to be a legitimate competitor to the psychologists’ claims that they were the true experts in studying the mind. To become the ultimate arbiters of mental phenomena, psychologists had to publicly dismantle the claims of these competitors and render an explanation of the phenomena that the spiritualist produced in the language of psychology.<sup>64</sup> Moreover, it was also a matter of personal fascination for Hall, dating back to a childhood enthusiasm. Being raised in postrevivalist New England, he would describe himself as having been “brought up among the spiritists and always kept more or less tabs upon the whole matter.”<sup>65</sup> Piper was a highly valued boundary object between psychological and psychical research given that, because of her modesty, she seemed to hold the promise of genuinely proving a particular side’s interpretation.

Tanner’s authorship of the resulting book is noteworthy considering the typical gender politics that animated the scientific examination of spiritual and psychical phenomena. Invariably there existed a gendered division of labor where the male scientist would test, unmask, and explain away the powers of the female medium. Female authorship was the preserve of contributors to the psychical research periodicals, not psychological ones.<sup>66</sup> For example, in the contemporaneous exposure of the Italian medium Eusipia Palladino in New York City, respectable society women were invited to attend. Their primary function, however, was to serve as decoys, to persuade Palladino that the sitting was a genuine séance, while manly psychologists and magicians did the real work of manipulating the proceedings and secretly observing the medium’s movements.<sup>67</sup> Such a

script is unsurprising considering the sexual connotations that governed the spiritualist movement. After all, since the mid-19th century, there had been a close connection between the spiritualist and suffrage movements. In a world of limited opportunity for women because of adherence to the separate-spheres ideology and the cult of domesticity, spiritualism provided a venue where the female medium could earn money in a public occupation while channeling the personality of an often male spirit that behaved in a likewise manner. Séances were sexually charged affairs, with women making physical contact with strange men and rumors of their generating ectoplasm from bodily orifices. Particularly vocal, but espousing a commonly held opinion, Harry Houdini, the celebrated stage magician and leading antispiritualist crusader, was affronted by these women's appropriation of masculine gestures and speech.<sup>68</sup>

In this context, an important aspect of *Studies of Spiritism* then was that it served as Tanner's personal account of how she moved from a sympathetic observer to a skeptical debunker. In the preface, she emphasizes how she did not "enter upon my work with any spirit of antagonism, but rather in a spirit of doubt that inclined toward belief."<sup>69</sup> Tanner's narrative transforms her from the feminine subject position of potential credulity to embracing a kind of scientific masculinity characterized by the ultimate victory of doubt. The resulting study, rather than offering an impersonal assessment, consisted of a series of snapshots of psychical phenomena, the centerpiece being a detailed transcript of Tanner and Hall's biweekly encounters with Piper and her spirit control. Such a strategy enabled a conversion narrative for Tanner while also highlighting how such an interpretation came about under particular circumstances. She certainly embraced the incredulous and naturalistic assumptions of the new psychology, but this did not require advocating a view from nowhere epistemology. Successful narratives of exposures often required close adherence to the details of the particular circumstances of investigation. Furthermore, one can see continuity with her waitressing work insofar as the truth about a situation comes about through immersion in the experience and uses the art of exposure. Such a perspective was quite different from that of her fellow investigator; in retrospect, Hall wanted a more systematic account of events published. Ten years afterward, he would express being "ashamed" about his contribution to the final product, feeling that he had not done "the subject justice."<sup>70</sup>

Although *Studies in Spiritism* was generally well received by the scientific community and unsurprisingly panned by adherents of psychical research, it did not noticeably improve Tanner's standing within the academy. As a scholar outside the professorial stream, she was acutely aware of her marginal position and repeatedly sought formal recognition of her accomplishments. Following her time as Hall's personal assistant during the Piper investigations, in 1911 the university's board of governors voted to appoint her as research assistant attached to the Children's Institute.<sup>71</sup> Three years later, her salary was increased from \$200 to \$1,000 per year, and she was granted the additional title of lecturer. Such moves did little to give Tanner a greater sense of security or stability at Clark. After 9 years at the university, she wrote to Hall, requesting that her "name be taken off the list of annual appointments and be put into that of the staff." In her letter, Tanner emphasized that she was not seeking an increase in salary but an assurance of permanence from the university.<sup>72</sup> Although Hall was overtly sympathetic to

her plight and granted the change, he was unable to recognize his own complicity.<sup>73</sup> As the university president wrote, without irony, in a letter of recommendation, Tanner “has withdrawn from her lectureship solely because she was (with too much ground, alas) dissatisfied that women are not recognized in the university.”<sup>74</sup> His relationship to Tanner exemplifies the ambiguities of Hall’s attitude toward female academics, nurturing certain persons individually while opposing female education, advancement, and equality writ large.

After leaving the university in 1918, Tanner purchased the Majestic Cinema in Worcester and dedicated her time to its management.<sup>75</sup> Her post-Clark fate was an unusual one for a psychologist and former child saver of the Progressive Era, a period when reformers like Addams warned of the moral perils of such commercial amusements.<sup>76</sup> The 350-seat theater had been opened by a machinist in 1909 and quickly became a popular haunt of the city’s immigrant, laboring populace. At the time she acquired the Majestic, the movie theater as a social institution was expanding from a primarily working-class form of leisure to one that included a broader audience.<sup>77</sup> Tanner’s theater still catered to a rough, male audience, a fact she emphasized in a profile published in a local paper as part of a series on “Worcester Women Who Work.” She reminded the reader how hers was “a distinctly man’s theater” and that she organized the programming accordingly. Yet, she was also convinced that such a clientele was in fact better served by her, citing how boisterous drinkers in the audience would respond more politely to a woman manager asking for silence. In her experience, when a man fulfilled such role, it had traditionally provoked violence. She concluded on a note about how she remained a psychologist even though she had formally given up her former vocation. The cinema provided “a chance to study people and to work out one’s own ideas to some extent.”<sup>78</sup> In this sense, Tanner had returned to her ethnographic mode, although she did not publish anything further based on her experiences with the cinema. As Tanner entered the 1920s, the management of the movie theater had replaced the observation of psychological life as her chief pursuit.

In retrospect, it is difficult to ascertain whether Tanner’s eclecticism was the origin or result of her disciplinary marginalization. Even those early female psychologist’s whose contributions were recovered in the 1970s and 1980s had the advantage of having a single, overarching research interest to unify their careers. From the outset, Tanner combined an interest in orthodox problems and more controversial solutions, all the while trying to operate within the boundaries of scientific psychology. Certainly at Clark, as the person in charge of experimental pedagogy, she embraced modes more legible to the psychological establishment, yet it appears that her gender was detrimental to her long-term academic success. Ultimately, she could not even secure position for herself as a child psychologist, a relatively conventional professional specialization for a woman of her era. In its small triumphs of insight and ultimate failure in gaining acknowledgment, Tanner’s path illuminates the structures of scientific life at the turn of the 20th century. A biographical account of her psychological pursuits does illuminate the boundaries of possibility within the emerging discipline.

Despite its popularity, biography has become a rather controversial academic genre, especially with the rise of social history. Within the history of science, biography as a tool is problematic as scholars attempt to get away from a “great

man” narrative in favor of illuminating structures.<sup>79</sup> Philosophers of science as diverse as Imre Lakatos and Michel Foucault have influentially argued that individual agency did not amount to much and that knowledge resided in subjectless entities, whether they be research programs or epistemes. Yet, Theodore Porter has recently emphasized how the heterogeneous passions of the biographical subject ought to be interpreted to see how their diversity in fact constitutes the unity of the “scientist,” thereby broadening our understanding of what constitutes the boundaries of the scientific enterprise.<sup>80</sup> Failing to gain institutional recognition and thus lapsing into obscurity, Tanner left far fewer archival traces for the historian to analyze compared with Porter’s famous subject, the romantic turned statistician Karl Pearson. Similarly, Thomas Söderqvist’s call for existential biographies of scientific subjects also partially helps make sense of the heterogeneity of Tanner’s science.<sup>81</sup> Söderqvist’s approach focuses attention on the choices the individual scientist makes and, in Tanner’s case, she was convinced of the need to live a life of philosophizing, a decision that required she embrace diverse projects while also bringing self-reflection to her objects of inquiry. Yet, an existential perspective risks masking the ways in which social circumstances and structures limited and shaped the options available to female psychologists like Tanner. Although not as extreme as historian Alain Corbin’s bold attempt to write the biography of an anonymous 19th-century laborer who left no self-representations, this article was similarly concerned with, comparatively speaking, “the life of an unknown.”<sup>82</sup> Like Corbin, I have been using this biographical case to illuminate broader structures while also examining how the path of a single individual gives unity to such diverse pursuits.

Although lacking the formal unity of a clearly defined research program, Tanner left in her heterogeneous array of writings a script by which to narrate her life. The unifying thread is her epistemological stance. As the brutal metaphor of a woman likened to a “tied-up dog” used in her first publication indicates, Amy E. Tanner was acutely aware of the constraints placed on women’s knowing at the turn of the 20th century. Whether covertly living as a waitress or stage managing an investigation into psychological powers, Tanner always highlighted her own particular viewpoint in the process of producing knowledge. For the partial perspective, celebrated by a later generation of feminist scholars, was fruitful for Tanner as well.

### Endnotes

1. Amy Tanner to G. Stanley Hall, January 31, 1907, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, Mass. Hereafter cited as GSHP.
2. For an insightful discussion of this epistolary genre and the cultural norms that sustained it, see Scott Sandage, *Born Losers: A History of Failure in America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005).
3. Tanner, *The Child: His Thinking, Feeling, and Doing* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1904).
4. Tanner to Hall, February 10, 1907, GSHP.
5. Sandra Harding, *The Science Question in Feminism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 136–62, and Donna J. Haraway, “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective,” *Feminist Studies* 14 (1988): 575–99. Following Harding and Haraway, I am not proposing that Tanner held an

essentialist, womanly way of perceiving the world, especially one that could be characterized as antiscientific. Rather her research operated within an epistemological framework informed by the feminist concern of her day: an epistemology that commingled with other approaches that emphasized the need to locate the knower in the world.

6. Donna Haraway argues that the positivist epistemology is deeply gendered as scientific practices are simultaneously coded as male while this activity is rendered invisible. By embracing a masculinized version of the formally feminine virtue of modesty, the scientist claims to act as an unproblematic ventriloquist for nature, denying that his own embodied presence shapes the knowledge he presents. See Haraway, "Modest Witness: Feminist Diffractions in Science Studies," in *The Disunity of Science: Boundaries, Contexts, and Power*, ed. Peter Galison and David J. Stump (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 428–41. Haraway's analysis is rooted in historical studies of Robert Boyle's 17th-century version of the scientific life. See Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, *Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), and Elizabeth Potter, *Gender and Boyle's Law of Gases* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001). For an account of Boyle that explicitly rejects these political readings, see Rose-Mary Sargent, *The Diffident Naturalist: Robert Boyle and the Philosophy of Experiment* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

7. In contrast, Nancy F. Cott has argued that many early 20th-century feminists embraced the language of professionalism and scientific objectivity. In contrast to politics and business where wealth and personal connections seemed paramount, the professional social sciences held great appeal with their ideals of impersonal, neutral standards, and learned expertise. See Cott, *The Grounding of Modern Feminism* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987), 216–17. For divergent interpretations of the political meaning of neutrality in the social sciences, see Dorothy Ross, *The Origins of American Social Science* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1991), and Theodore M. Porter, *Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).

8. James Livingston, *Pragmatism, Feminism, and Democracy: Rethinking the Politics of American History* (New York: Routledge, 2001). For the attempts to purge such politicized perspectives from the official domain of the social sciences during this era, see Mary O. Furner, *Advocacy and Objectivity: A Crisis in the Professionalization of American Social Science, 1865–1905* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1975).

9. The exemplary study remains Elizabeth Scarborough and Laurel Furumoto, *Untold Lives: The First Generation of American Women Psychologists* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987). This ongoing project has been extended to examine other national contexts and into later generations, although we still lack a synthetic understanding of the impact that women and feminism have had on subsequent developments in psychology.

10. Key works in this tradition include Rosalind Rosenberg, *Beyond Separate Spheres: Intellectual Roots of Modern Feminism* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982); Stephanie A. Shields, "The Variability Hypothesis: The History of a Biological Model of Sex Differences in Intelligence," *Signs* 7 (1982): 769–97; J. G. Morawski, "The Measurement of Masculinity and Femininity: Engendering Categorical Realities," *Journal of Personality* 53 (1985): 196–223; Laurel Furumoto, "Shared Knowledge: The Experimentalists, 1904–1929," in *The Rise of Experimentation in American Psychology*, ed. Jill G. Morawski (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), 94–113; Shields, "Passionate Men, Emotional Women: Psychology Constructs Gender Difference in the Late 19th Century," *History of Psychology* 10 (2007): 92–110.

11. Elizabeth Scarborough, "Constructing a Women's History of Psychology," *The Feminist Psychologist* 32 (2005): 6.

12. See Margaret W. Rossiter, *Women Scientists in America: Struggles and Strategies to 1940* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982).

13. For an analysis of her contributions to the child study movement while at Clark, see Lesley A. Diehl, "Theodate Smith and Amy Tanner: Child Savers of Clark University," *Journal of Genetic Psychology* 152 (1991): 273–87.

14. On the importance of such micro-history approaches, see Michael M. Sokal, "Baldwin, Cattell, and *The Psychological Review*: A Collaboration and Its Discontents," *History of the Human Sciences* 10 (1997): 57–89.

15. Jill G. Morawski, "Self-Regard and Other-Regard: Reflexive Practices in American Psychology, 1890–1940," *Science in Context* 5 (1992): 281–308, and Morawski, "Reflexivity and the Psychology," *History of the Human Sciences* 18 (2005): 77–105. For later moments when reflexivity was acknowledged within psychological thought and practice, see James H. Capshew, *Psychologists on the March: Science, Practice, and Professional Identity in America, 1929–1969* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 212–40; Capshew, "Reflexivity Revisited: Changing Psychology's Frame of Reference," in *Psychology's Territories: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives from Different Disciplines*, ed. Mitchell Ash and Thomas Sturm (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2007), 343–56; Jamie Cohen-Cole, "The Reflexivity of Cognitive Science: The Scientist as Model of Human Nature," *History of the Human Sciences* 18, no. 4 (2005): 107–40.

16. See Kurt Danziger, "Origins and Basic Principles of Wundt's *Völkerpsychologie*," *British Journal of Social Psychology* 22 (1983): 303–13. For a recent dissent from this view, see John D. Greenwood, "Wundt, *Völkerpsychologie*, and Experimental Social Psychology," *History of Psychology* 6, no. 1 (2003): 70–88.

17. Morawski, "Reflexivity and the Psychology," 82–84.

18. See Mary Terrall, "Biography as Cultural History of Science," *Isis* 97 (2006): 306–13.

19. On psychology's scientific ideology, see Michael M. Sokal, "James McKeen Cattell and Mental Anthropometry: Nineteenth-Century Science and Reform and the Origins of Psychological Testing," in *Psychological Testing and American Society, 1890–1930*, ed. Michael M. Sokal (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1987), 21–45.

20. My interest in the heterogeneous ways in which knowledge-making is practiced under the label of science is inspired by the work of John V. Pickstone, although I am somewhat skeptical about how well his specific typologies apply to the history of the human sciences. See Pickstone, *Ways of Knowing: A New History of Science, Technology, and Medicine* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).

21. Roger Smith, "Does the History of Psychology Have a Subject?" *History of Psychology* 1 (1988): 147–77.

22. See Amy Tanner and Kate Anderson, "Simultaneous Sense Stimulations: Practice Study," *Psychological Review* 3 (1896): 378–83, and James Rowland Angell, "James Rowland Angell" in *History of Psychology in Autobiography*, vol. 3, ed. Carl Murchison (New York: Russell and Russell, 1961): 1–38, 30.

23. Lois Banner, *American Beauty* (New York: Knopf, 1983), 154–74.

24. For a recent critical history of this social type, see Martha H. Patterson, *Beyond the Gibson Girl: Reimagining the American New Woman, 1895–1915* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2005).

25. Marion Talbot, *More than Lore: Reminiscences of Marion Talbot, Dean of Women, the University of Chicago, 1892–1925* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936). On the kind of activist social science that emerged from the University of Chicago, see Ellen F. Fitzpatrick, *Endless Crusade: Women Social Scientists and Progressive Reform* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

26. Rosenberg, *Beyond Separate Spheres*, 54–68.
27. See Carroll Smith-Rosenberg and Charles Rosenberg, “The Female Animal: Medical and Biological Views of Woman and Her Role in Nineteenth-Century America,” *Journal of American History* 60 (1973): 332–56, and John S. Haller and Robin M. Haller, *The Physician and Sexuality in Victorian America* (New York: Norton, 1974). For the debate over women’s roles and domesticity within the woman’s movement, see especially Louise Michele Newman, *White Women’s Rights: The Racial Origins of Feminism in the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
28. When he undertook the study, Jastrow would have been aware of the significance of women in higher education having been a classmate of Christine Ladd-Franklin while both were studying at Johns Hopkins University in the mid-1880s.
29. Joseph Jastrow, “A Study of Mental Statistics,” *New Review* 5 (1891): 559–68, 565–66.
30. Joseph Jastrow, “Heredity and Mental Traits,” *Science* 40 (Oct. 16, 1914): 555–56. On Jastrow’s antihereditarianism, see Andrew Heinze, “Jews and American Popular Psychology: Reconsidering the Protestant Paradigm of Popular Thought,” *Journal of American History* 88 (2001): 950–78, 960.
31. See Michael Pettit, “Joseph Jastrow, the Psychology of Deception, and the Racial Economy of Observation,” *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 43 (2007): 159–75.
32. See Cordelia C. Nevers and Mary W. Calkins, “Dr. Jastrow on the Community of Ideas of Men and Women,” *Psychological Review* 2 (1895): 363–67, and Mary W. Calkins, “Community of Ideas of Men and Women,” *Psychological Review* 3 (1896): 426–30.
33. See Calkins, “Community of Ideas of Men and Women,” 430.
34. Lorraine Daston has rightly highlighted how “naturalization” as a strategy carries different cultural meanings at different historical moments. The meanings attributed in the Jastrow–Calkins debate represent a particular late 19th-century formulation. See Daston, “The Naturalized Female Intellect,” *Science in Context* 5 (1992): 209–35.
35. Tanner, “The Community of Ideas in Men and Women,” *Psychological Review* 3 (1896): 548–50, 550.
36. My definition derives from Cott, *The Grounding of Modern Feminism*, 4–5.
37. Tanner did not further contribute to the debate about the psychological nature of sexual differences but in 1898, fellow Chicago graduate student Helen Bradford Thompson (later Woolley) commenced her experimental studies of “the mental traits of sex.” Thompson sought to develop more rigorous means of testing higher mental faculties than had been presented in the earlier debate. See Helen Bradford Thompson, *The Mental Traits of Sex: An Experimental Investigation of the Normal Mind in Men and Women* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903). For a detailed historical account of Thompson’s activities, see Rosenberg, *Beyond Separate Spheres*, 68–81.
38. Amy Eliza Tanner, “Association of Ideas: A Preliminary Study” (PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 1900). The published version of her thesis came out in 1900, but Tanner received her doctorate in 1898. See “Academic Class Graduates,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, July 6, 1898.
39. On the gendered dimension of introspective psychology, see Furumoto, “Shared Knowledge,” 103–08.
40. Tanner, “Association of Ideas,” 31.
41. Tanner, “Association of Ideas,” 10.
42. She discussed her career trajectory in Tanner to Hall, February 10, 1907, GSHP.
43. For a good historical assessment of Hall’s own developmental psychology, see Hamilton Cravens, “The Historical Context of G. Stanley Hall’s *Adolescence* (1904),” *History of Psychology* 9 (2006): 172–85.

44. On the labor question, see Rosanne Currarino, "The Politics of 'More': The Labor Question and the Idea of Economic Liberty in Industrial America," *Journal of American History* 93 (2006): 17–36.

45. Jennifer Platt, "The Development of the 'Participant Observation' Method in Sociology: Origin Myth and History," *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 19 (1983): 379–93.

46. See Mark Pittenger, "A World of Difference: Constructing the 'Underclass' in Progressive America," *American Quarterly* 49 (1997): 26–65; Toby Higbie, "Crossing Class Boundaries: Tramp Ethnographers and Narratives of Class in Progressive Era America," *Social Science History* 21 (1997): 559–92; Pittenger, "What's on the Worker's Mind: Class Passing and the Study of the Industrial Workplace in the 1920s," *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 39 (2003): 143–61. For a recent positive assessment of this research tradition, including Tanner's contribution, see Tim Hallett and Gary Alan Fine, "Ethnography 1900: Learning from the Field Research of an Old Century," *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* 29 (2000): 593–617.

47. Amy E. Tanner, "Glimpses at the Mind of a Waitress," *The American Journal of Sociology* 13 (1907): 48–55, 48.

48. For the social history of waitressing, see Dorothy Sue Cobble, *Dishing It Out: Waitresses and Their Unions in the Twentieth-Century* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1991).

49. For a critical account of the constitution of "experience" as an authentic claim to authority, see Joan W. Scott, "The Evidence of Experience," *Critical Inquiry* 17 (1991): 773–97.

50. Tanner, "Glimpses at the Mind of a Waitress," 54.

51. Pittenger, "A World of Difference," 43–44, briefly mentions Tanner as a class passer. My more sympathetic reading of Tanner is not intended to deny the class assumptions of the Progressive Era reformers or how their social science did in fact call into being notions of an almost biologically determined class difference. That said, I would insist that Tanner's class politics are quite different compared with the more sensationalistic Flynt.

52. Kathryn Kish Sklar, "Hull House in the 1890s: A Community of Women Reformers," *Signs* 10 (1985): 658–77.

53. Maud Younger, "The Diary of an Amateur Waitress: An Industrial Problem from the Worker's Point of View," *McClure's Magazine* 28 (1907): 543–52 and 665–77.

54. Tanner, "Glimpses at the Mind of a Waitress," 55. See also the coverage of her investigation in "Wed Her Gentleman Friend Only Hope for Waitress," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, July 23, 1907, and Ada May Kreckler, "What Women Are Doing in the World," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, August 11, 1907.

55. Amy Tanner, "Question of Literary Property," *The Nation* 88 (February 25, 1909): 193. The controversy concerned the authorship of Annie Marion MacLean, "Life in the Pennsylvania Coal Fields with Particular Reference to Women," *The American Journal of Sociology* 14, no. 3 (1908): 329–51. MacLean did give credit to Tanner for carrying out the Pennsylvania fieldwork in *Wage-Earning Women* (New York: Macmillan, 1910). For discussion of this incident that is sympathetic to MacLean, see Tim Hallett and Greg Jeffers, "A Long-Neglected Mother of Contemporary Ethnography: Annie Marion MacLean and the Memory of a Method," *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* 37, no. 1 (2008): 3–37, 25.

56. Hall to Tanner, February 13, 1907, GSHP.

57. Hall to Tanner, May 21, 1907, GSHP.

58. Tanner to Hall, May 29, 1907, GSHP.

59. Hall to Tanner, June 4, 1907, GSHP.

60. A formal affiliation with the Children's Institute did not diminish Tanner's eclecticism during her time at Clark. In addition to publications and public lectures

relating to pedagogy themes, she continued to pursue her philosophical and sociological interests with an increased historical inflection. Even within the *American Journal of Psychology*, she published on both Spinoza's relevance to contemporary psychology and on the sociology of technological inventions. See Tanner, "Spinoza and Modern Psychology," *American Journal of Psychology* 18 (1907): 514–18, and Tanner, "Certain Social Aspects of Invention," *American Journal of Psychology* 26 (1915): 388–416.

61. Diehl, "Theodate Smith and Amy Tanner," 276–84.

62. Tanner to Hall, March 24, 1907, GSHP.

63. See Diehl, "Theodate Smith and Amy Tanner," and Jeanne Brooks-Gunn and Anna Duncan Johnson, "G. Stanley Hall's Contribution to Science, Practice, and Policy: The Child Study, Parent Education, and Child Welfare Movements," *History of Psychology* 9 (2006): 247–58.

64. Deborah J. Coon, "Testing the Limits of Sense and Science: American Experimental Psychologists Combat Spiritualism, 1880–1920," *American Psychologist* 47 (1992): 143–51.

65. Hall to Joseph Jastrow, February 24, 1920, GSHP.

66. Although there were some male mediums, the most written-about cases were all females and, with the exception of Tanner, women were not named to the scientific committees sent to investigate them.

67. See the accounts given in Joseph Jastrow, "The Unmasking of Paladino," *Collier's* 45 (May 14, 1910): 21–22 and 40–42, and W. S. Davis, "The New York Exposure of Eusapia Palladino," *Journal of the American Society for Psychological Research* 4 (1910): 401–24.

68. See Ann Braude, *Radical Spirits: Spiritualism and Women's Rights in Nineteenth-Century America* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989), and John F. Kasson, *Houdini, Tarzan, and the Perfect Man: The White Male Body and the Challenge of Modernity in America* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2001), 141–53.

69. Tanner, *Studies of Spiritism* (New York: Appleton, 1910), vi.

70. Hall to Joseph Jastrow, February 24, 1920, GSHP. It should be noted that David E. Leary has recently emphasized that Hall himself was a more tentative and less dogmatic thinker than typically portrayed. See David E. Leary, "G. Stanley Hall, a Man of Many Words: The Role of Reading, Speaking, and Writing in His Psychological Work," *History of Psychology* 9 (2006): 198–223.

71. Hall to Tanner, June 1, 1911, GSHP.

72. Tanner to Hall, May 22, 1916, GSHP.

73. Lesley A. Diehl, "The Paradox of G. Stanley Hall: Foe of Coeducation and Educator of Women," *American Psychologist* 41 (1986): 868–78.

74. Hall to A. Caswell Ellie, August 8, 1918, GSHP.

75. Hall to Joseph Jastrow, February 9, 1920, GSHP.

76. Jane Addams, *The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets* (New York: Macmillan, 1910). See also Lauren Rabinovitz, *For the Love of Pleasure: Women, Movies, and Culture in Turn-of-the-Century Chicago* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1998).

77. Information about the Majestic has been gleaned from Roy Rosenzweig's study of working-class leisure in Worcester. See Rosenzweig, *Eight Hours for What We Want: Workers and Leisure in an Industrial City, 1870–1920* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 191–221.

78. "My Job and Me: Told by Worcester Women Who Work," source and date unknown, circa 1920, Amy E. Tanner Biographical File, Worcester Public Library, Worcester, Mass.

79. See Thomas L. Hankins, "In Defense of Biography: The Use of Biography in the History of Science," *History of Science* 27 (1979): 1–16.

80. Theodore M. Porter, "Is the Life of a Scientist a Scientific Unit?" *Isis* 97 (2006): 314–21. Put into practice, see Porter, *Karl Pearson: The Scientific Life in a Statistical Age* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).

81. Thomas Söderqvist, "Existential Projects and Existential Choice in Science: Science Biography as Edifying Genre," in *Telling Lives in Science: Essays on Scientific Biography*, ed. Michael Shortland and Richard Yeo (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 45–86.

82. Alain Corbin, *The Life of an Unknown: The Rediscovered World of a Clog Maker in Nineteenth-Century France*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).

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### **Correction to Deary, Lawn, and Bartholomew (2008)**

In the article, "A Conversation Between Charles Spearman, Godfrey Thomson, and Edward L. Thorndike: The International Examinations Inquiry Meetings 1931-1938" by Ian J. Deary, Martin Lawn, and David J. Bartholomew (*History of Psychology*, 2008, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 122–142), the authors would like to indicate that Charles Spearman's year of death was incorrectly reported as 1949. Spearman's correct year of death is 1945.

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